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Abstract 
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Persecutory delusions have been associated with a tendency to „jump to 
conclusions‟ and an abnormal attributional style. We hypothesised that jumping to 
conclusions could account for the observed biases in attributional style.  Individuals 
with persecutory delusions (n=24) were compared with matched depressed 
psychiatric (n=24) and non-psychiatric (n=24) comparison groups using a modified 
inductive reasoning task (John & Dodgson, 1994) on which participants requested 
information before making attributions for common social events. Both clinical 
groups „jumped to conclusions‟ and made attributions on the basis of little 
evidence. This tendency was greatest in individuals with persecutory delusions. 
Differences were also found in the proportions of questions seeking internal, 
external and situational information.  However, there were no significant 
differences between the groups in the final attributions made. These findings 
inform a model of persecutory delusions whereby a limited cognitive search 
strategy may influence attributional style.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
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After many years of neglect, the delusional beliefs of individuals with 
psychosis have become the subject of intensive research, leading to a number of 
theories about the psychological mechanisms responsible for them. It has been 
proposed that delusions in general arise as a consequence of the inability to gather 
and weigh data relevant to hypotheses (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991),  
resulting in a tendency for individuals with delusions to „jump to conclusions‟ and 
make decisions on the basis of very little evidence. Paranoid (persecutory) 
delusions, on the other hand, have been attributed to preferential attention to, and 
recall of, threat-related information (Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Kaney, Wolfenden, 
Dewey, & Bentall, 1992) and have also been linked to a deficit in „theory of mind‟, 
the ability to understand the mental states of other people (Frith & Corcoran, 1996), 
and an abnormal style of reasoning about significant life events (Kaney & Bentall, 
1989; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997). Given that there is at least some evidence to 
support each of these proposals (see Garety & Freeman, 1999, and Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001, for reviews) there is now a 
need to explore interactions between the different psychological processes 
identified in order to develop an integrative model of persecutory delusions. In the 
present paper, we describe a study designed to investigate a possible interaction 
between biased explanatory style and jumping to conclusions.  
Explanatory style and persecutory delusions. 
A number of studies have reported a relationship between persecutory 
delusions and attributional style. Kaney & Bentall (1989) compared individuals with 
persecutory delusions, depressed participants and controls on Peterson et al.'s 
(1982) Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ). They found that both clinical groups 
made excessively stable and global explanations for negative events. However, 
individuals with persecutory delusions showed a bias towards making excessively 
external attributions for negative events and internal attributions for positive events, 
a bias which is opposite to that commonly observed in depressed participants 
(Sweeny, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986). This finding has been replicated by a number 
of other investigators (Candido & Romney, 1990; Fear, Sharp, & Healy, 1996; Lee 
& Won, 1998) and using different methods (Kaney & Bentall, 1992; Kinderman & 
                                                                                                 Paranoid Reasoning  4  
Bentall, 1997; Lee, Beattie & Bentall, in press).  An apparently inconsistent result 
was reported by Martin & Penn, (2002), who failed to find attributional differences 
between individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia experiencing persecutory 
delusions and individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia who were not experiencing  
persecutory delusions; however, in a correlational analysis these authors did find a 
relationship between paranoia scores and the number of external-personal 
attributions made. 
The tendency to attribute the cause of negative events to external factors 
has been shown to maintain self-esteem in healthy individuals through the 
avoidance of responsibility (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Taylor, 1988) and the 
evidence suggests that this bias is exaggerated in individuals with persecutory 
delusions. In an attempt to explain this finding, Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney (1994) 
proposed a cognitive model of paranoia, suggesting that externalizing attributions 
are triggered when threat-related information activates discrepancies between 
beliefs about the self and ideals. These externalizing attributions reduce the 
discrepancy between beliefs about the self and ideals but, when made consistently 
over a period of time, lead to a persecutory worldview in which others are believed 
to hold hostile views about the self. This idea that paranoid thinking arises from 
dysfunctional attempts to regulate low self-esteem is consistent with some 
psychodynamic accounts of paranoia (Colby, 1977; Hingley, 1992) and the idea of 
that paranoid schizophrenia is a form of 'camouflaged depression‟ (Zigler & Glick, 
1988). 
This hypothesis that persecutory delusions arise as a consequence of 
defensive processes has been contested by other researchers on the grounds that 
it predicts high self-esteem in individuals with paranoia (Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
However, Bentall et al. (2001) point out that a defensive account of persecutory 
delusions does not necessarily imply that self-esteem will always be high, as 
sometimes externalizing attributional biases may be insufficient to overcome 
feelings of low self-esteem. Instead, they suggest that individuals with persecutory 
delusions may suffer from highly unstable and fluctuating self-esteem. In fact, 
studies in which self-esteem has been measured in participants with persecutory 
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delusions and controls have yielded inconsistent results, some finding evidence of 
preserved self-esteem in paranoid participants (e.g. Lyon, Kaney, & Bentall, 1994) 
and some finding evidence of low self-esteem (Freeman et al., 1998). In a recent 
longitudinal study of a large group of first episode psychotic patients, Drake et al. 
(2004) found no consistent association between self-esteem and paranoid 
symptoms, but at each of four assessment points (beginning shortly after first 
admission and ending 18 month later) observed that depression appeared to be 
partly a response to paranoid beliefs.  
Data gathering biases in individuals with delusions. 
Hemsley & Garety (1986) argued that delusions might be the consequence 
of an inability to use probabilistic information when reasoning about hypotheses. 
This proposal was first investigated by Huq, Garety, & Hemsley (1988) and Garety 
et al., (1991) in studies in which participants were shown two jars each containing 
beads of two colors. In one jar, one color far outnumbered the other (85:15), and in 
the other jar the proportions were reversed. The jars were then hidden, a sequence 
of beads was presented and the participants were asked to guess which jar they 
had been drawn from. It was found that participants with delusions requested less 
information prior to making a decision, and were overconfident in their decisions, 
when compared to healthy controls and a psychiatric control group. Garety and her 
colleagues argued that individuals with delusions have difficulty integrating 
information over time when adjusting hypothesis. These authors found that this 
„jumping to conclusions‟ reasoning style was also associated with lower IQ (Garety 
et al., 1991). 
A number of investigators have replicated the finding that individuals with 
delusions perform poorly when asked to evaluate hypothesis in the light of 
sequentially presented information (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997a, 1997b; 
Fear et al., 1996; John & Dodgson, 1994; Young & Bentall, 1997).  However, the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for this bias remain incompletely understood. 
John & Dodgson (1994) studied the reasoning and information gathering skills of 
individuals with delusions compared to depressed participants and controls, using 
a version of the „20 questions game‟. Participants were allowed to ask up to 20 
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yes/no questions until they felt they had enough information to guess which object 
or famous person the interviewer was thinking of. Questions were coded as 
constraint-locating (those that served to narrow down the number of hypotheses) 
or direct hypothesis questions (those that directly tested a hypothesis). Individuals 
with delusions requested less information than controls before making a decision, 
using less constraint-locating questions before making their first guess. John and 
Dodgson suggested that, by jumping to conclusions, those participants with 
delusions were able to complete the task with minimum cognitive effort. Dudley et 
al. (1997) similarly noted that early decisions reduced the cognitive demands 
placed upon participants and their overall personal investment in the task, 
suggesting that this was the source of deluded participants‟ motivation to jump to 
conclusions. They demonstrated that increasing the emotional salience of the test 
material led to increased evidence of jumping to conclusions across all three 
groups of participants, a finding that was replicated by Young & Bentall (1997). 
It has more recently been suggested that the jumping to conclusions 
reasoning style might be motivated by an intolerance of ambiguity. The term „need 
for closure‟ has been coined by Kruglanski (1989, p.14) to describe “the desire for 
a definite answer on some topic, any answer compared to confusion and 
ambiguity”. Bentall & Swarbrick (2003) measured need for closure in currently 
deluded paranoid participants, remitted paranoid participants, and healthy controls 
using a simplified version of Kruglanski‟s Need For Closure Scale (NFCS). The 
paranoid and remitted participants scored significantly higher on need for closure 
than the control group. However, although Colbert & Peters (2002) found that 
„delusion-prone‟ healthy individuals (defined as scoring in the upper quartile on the 
Peters Delusions Inventory) also scored highly on the NFCS, they found that NFCS 
scores did not correlate with the jumping to conclusions reasoning style.  
Relationship between attributional judgments and jumping to conclusions. 
Given that attributional style and jumping to conclusions have both been 
implicated in persecutory delusions, it is possible that these are not completely 
unrelated phenomena. When generating attributions, individuals engage in a 
mental search strategy that is terminated on the retrieval of an appropriate causal 
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construct, this process being influenced by a number of cognitive constraints and 
decision rules (Kinderman & Benn, 2002). Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull (1988) have 
shown that more cognitive effort is required to generate situational attributions 
compared to internal or personal (other-blaming) attributions. Individuals with a 
tendency to „jump to conclusions‟ might be expected to make attributional 
decisions on the basis of less mental search and limited evidence.  This in turn is 
likely to lead to relatively few situational attributions. We therefore hypothesize that 
individuals with persecutory delusions : i) when offered the opportunity to obtain 
more information when making an attributional judgement will tend to reach 
premature conclusions  ii) when asking questions, will seek more information 
specifically about other people and iii) will reach conclusions which excessively 
implicate the involvement of others.  In the present experiment, we therefore 
adapted the guessing game paradigm of John & Dodgson (1994) to assess 
whether individuals with persecutory delusions were, as predicted, more likely to 
jump to conclusions when making causal attributions than depressed participants 
 
Method 
          Measures 
Depressive symptomatology was measured using the Beck Depression 
Inventory II (BDI II) (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). This is a well established tool in 
measuring the severity of depression in clinical samples (Beck, Steer and Brown, 
1996). The validity, reliability and internal consistency of the measure have been 
established in primary care medical patients (Amau et al, 2001) and psychiatric 
outpatients (Steer et al, 1997).  
The National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson and O‟Connell, 1978), a 
brief measure of verbal intelligence, was used to establish intellectual comparability 
between the groups. The NART closely correlates with other measures of 
intelligence (Crawford, Parker, Allan, Jack & Morrison, 1991).  
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) is a measure of 
global self-esteem consists of ten statements which participants endorse on a 4 point 
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scale (from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). Baumeister et al. (2003; Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest) DISCUSS REL AND VAL   
The Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster &  Klem, 1993). :  The 
need for closure scale consists of 42 items measuring the desire for predictability, 
preference for order and structure, decisiveness, close-mindedness and discomfort 
with ambiguity. Participants indicated how much they agreed with each statement 
on a six point likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
Higher scores indicate a greater need for closure. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) 
report that the scale has demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha 
= .841) and a high test-retest reliability (r = .861). 
 The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) : The paranoia scale 
was designed for administration to non-patient participants and has good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability. 
An interview-based measure of psychotic symptomatology, the KGV 
(Krawiecka, Goldberg & Vaughn, 1977), was also administered, in order to provide 
clinical information on the participants 
 
The Twenty Questions Reasoning Task. 
The reasoning task involved five negative items taken from the Internal, 
Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1996a).  The IPSAQ is a 32 item questionnaire measuring causal attributions. It 
contains 16 positive events, e.g. „a friend helped you with the gardening‟ and 16 
negative events e.g. „a friend talked about you behind your back.‟  Participants are 
required to read situation, try to imagine it and then write down their one most likely 
causal attribution. Participants are given three options, internal (concerned with 
them), external-personal (concerned with other people) and situational (concerned 
with circumstances or chance). The five negative items taken from the IPSAQ to 
form the reasoning task were: a friend talked about you behind your back, a friend 
refused to help you with a job, a friend made an insulting remark to you, a friend 
ignored you and a friend picked a fight with you 
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A „twenty questions game‟ design was then used drawing on previous work 
by John and Dodgson (1994). This enables measurement of the amount of 
information requested prior to making a decision and also allows exploration of the 
type of information that is requested. The format a game was intended to be „user 
friendly‟ and helpful in minimizing motivation problems (John & Dodgson, 1994). 
The general procedure for the reasoning task was that the participants 
were asked if they had ever played the 20 questions game, and an example of the 
game was demonstrated as a practice item, e.g. (“I‟m thinking of an object. You 
must guess what I‟m thinking of by asking up to twenty questions that I can only 
answer „yes‟ or „no‟.”) This ensured that the participant understood what was 
required of the game and helped to engage and motivate them towards the task.  
The participants were then informed that the reasoning task was adapted from the 
game. They were told that they were to be presented with a situation that they were 
required to imagine happening to them (i.e. A friend refused to help you with a job).  
They were informed that they were to try to think of the cause of the event, and that 
in order to do this they could ask up to 20 questions about the event but that the 
researcher could only answer „yes‟ or „no‟ to each question. They were then told 
that, when they had decided on the cause, this should be categorized as either 
internal (concerned with them), external-personal (concerned with other people) or 
situational (concerned with circumstances or chance). 
Participants were informed that there was no right or wrong answer and 
that it was their actual thinking process that was of interest. The first individual item 
taken from the IPSAQ was presented on a piece of card and was described as an 
imaginary situation. Participants were given another card displaying the three 
possible causes (as above). They were reminded that they had up to 20 questions 
to decide the cause of the event but that the researcher could only answer „yes‟ or 
„no‟. They were informed that there were no right or wrong answers. The „game‟ 
was then commenced. Any further explanation required to clarify the task was 
given. 
When a question was asked, the researcher responded with a pre-
prepared „yes‟ or „no‟ answer, which had been generated by the use of random 
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numbers. However, if a participant asked the same question on more than one 
occasion, a consistent answer, rather than the next randomly generated answer 
was given. The researcher recorded the number of questions asked and the actual 
questions. The questions were later coded in terms of attribution implied, ie. 
internal, external-personal, situational or deemed uncodeable.  The process and 
rules for the coding of attributional questions are outlined below. 
Internal: Questions were coded as internal if the question implied that the 
individual participant might be the cause of the event, for example, if the participant 
asked ‘Had I done something wrong?’  This question would be coded as internal.  
External-personal: Questions were coded as external-personal if the 
participant implied that another person or group of people might have caused the 
event, i.e. the question ‘Are they just a horrible person?’ would be coded as 
external-personal.  
Situational: Questions were coded as situational if the participant implied 
that the situation was connected to the event. Therefore, questions such as  ‘did 
this happen at work?’ or „were we at a party?‟ would be coded as situational.  
Uncodeable: Those questions which did not indicate any attributional 
hypotheses were deemed uncodeable. 
 All coding was completed blindly and independently by the first author and 
the third author. 82 % inter-rater agreement was reached. Disagreements were 
discussed and the final codings mutually agreed.  
Participants were encouraged to continue asking questions until they felt 
that they were in a position to make a decision about causality. Summaries of 
questions asked and answers received were given after every five questions, or 
when requested.  When the participant indicated that they had made a decision, 
they were asked if they were sure and their decision concerning causality was 
noted (internal, external-personal or situational). The next item was then 
administered until all 5 vignettes had been presented. The five vignettes were 
presented in counter-balanced order across the participants. Following the final 
vignette, participants were asked to rate their confidence in the decisions they had 
made on a 0-10 scale, where 0 = not at all confident and 10 = totally confident.  
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Participants  
Three groups of participants were employed, matched for age and sex. In 
the clinical groups, diagnostic classifications were made using DSM IV criteria 
(DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) by the first author, based on 
signs and symptoms reported and observed in clinical interviews, supported by 
case note data.  
The experimental group consisted of 24 participants experiencing 
persecutory delusions. Seventeen had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, six, schizo-
affective disorder, and one bipolar disorder. Persecutory delusions were defined 
according to the criteria suggested by Freeman & Garety (2000) and their 
presence was confirmed by the medical records, the reports of nursing staff, the 
participants‟ self reports and presentation during the KGV interview. All participants 
scored above 3 on the delusions subscale of the KGV. During the delusions 
section of the KGV interview, when participants disclosed persecutory delusions, 
they were asked whether they felt they deserved to be persecuted or harmed, so 
that they could be later divided into „poor me‟ and „bad me‟ groups as described by 
Trower & Chadwick (1989).   
There were 17 men and 7 women in the experimental group. The mean 
age was 38.21 (SD = 11.26) with a range of 43 from 20 - 63 years. 11 were 
outpatients at local day hospitals and 13 were inpatients on acute psychiatric 
wards. The mean number of years in education was 11.29  (SD = 1.57) and their 
mean NART IQ was 107.09  (SD = 11.01). The mean duration of illness was 63.55 
months (SD = 98.32), and the mean number of admissions to psychiatric hospital 
was 2.63 (SD = 4.00). A record was kept of the main delusional themes of 
participants in this group. 
The psychiatric control group consisted of 24 participants with a diagnosis 
of major depressive disorder. All participants within this group were non-psychotic, 
with no participant scoring above 1 on the delusions section of the KGV.  There 
were 17 men and 7 women. The mean age was 44.79 years  (SD = 11.12) and the 
range was from 17 - 58 years. 18 were outpatients at local day hospitals and 6 
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were inpatients on acute psychiatric wards. The mean number of years in 
education was 11.21 (SD = 2.08) and their mean NART IQ was 104.92  (SD = 
13.19). The mean duration of illness was 82.09 months (SD = 86.30), and mean 
number of psychiatric admissions was 2.08 (SD = 2.54). 
A normal control group of 24 participants with no psychiatric history was 
recruited from informal contacts to approximately match the experimental 
participants for age and sex. There were 14 men and 10 women. Their mean age 
was 38.13 years, (SD = 10.61) with a range of 30 from 26 - 56 years. The mean 
number of years in education was 13.46 (SD = 2.59) and their mean NART IQ was 
115.5 (SD = 5.82). All participants in this group scored 0 on the KGV delusions 
subscale.  
98 people were asked to take part in the study, nineteen (19.39 %) refused 
and three (3.06%) dropped out at some point during the testing period.  
 
 
Results 
          
         Demographic Variables 
Demographic data are presented in Table 1. The three groups did not 
differ significantly in mean age (F(2,69) = 2.90, p = .06) or gender (Chi-square = 
1.13, p = .57).  Analysis of the clinical data for the two patient groups revealed no 
significant difference in length of time since first diagnosis, (z (46) = -1.6, p = .11). 
There were also no significant differences between the two clinical groups in their 
numbers of previous psychiatric admissions (t (46) = 0.56, p = .58).  
The three groups differed with regards to KGV total scores (F(2,69) = 
136.58, p < .0001), National adult reading test (NART) scores (F(2, 66) = 6.80, p < 
.005), Beck Depression scale (BDI – II) scores (F(2,68) = 45.60, p < .0001), self-
esteem scores (F(2,67) = 48.55 p < .0001) and paranoia scores (F(2,68) = 85.98, p 
< .0001). Pairwise comparisons (post hoc Tukeys HSD), revealed that the paranoid 
group had higher KGV total and paranoia scores than the other two groups, and 
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that the depressed group had higher KGV total scores than the control group (p< 
.05 for each comparison) but that differences on the NART, BDI-II and self-esteem 
measure were entirely accounted for by differences between the control group and 
the two clinical groups (p < .05 for each comparison).  The paranoid and 
depressed group did not differ from each other on any of these measures (p > .05). 
         „Jumping to Conclusions.‟ 
The mean number of questions asked by participants, across the five 
separate vignettes, prior to their decisions about causality are shown in Table 2.  A 
one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the these data. A 
significant main effect for group was found, revealing that, as predicted, the three 
groups differed significantly with regards to the mean number of questions asked 
on the reasoning task (F(2,69) = 23.48, p < .0005). 
Pair-wise comparisons (post hoc Tukey HSD tests), revealed that the 
control group asked significantly more questions than both the depressed (p < 
.005) and paranoid groups (p < .0001). The paranoid group asked significantly 
fewer questions than both the depressed (p < .005) and the control group (p < 
.0001). Thus, the hypothesis that individuals with persecutory delusions will „jump 
to conclusions‟ was supported.  
„Jumping to Conclusions‟ and depressed mood. 
The possible role of depressed mood in contributing to the observed 
pattern of results was further investigated using a regression analysis. To conduct 
this analysis, a dummy variable was created of „paranoid vs not paranoid‟ with all 
the participants in the „paranoid‟ group scoring 1, and all other participants scoring 
0. A regression analysis was then conducted with number of questions asked as 
the dependent variable and depressed mood, as measured by the BDI as a 
predictor in block 1, and the new dummy variable as a predictor in block 2.  
The overall regression equation was significant (F(2,68) = 23.86, p <.0005) 
and a lower level of depressed mood was a significant predictor of the number of 
questions asked (beta = .36, t = 3.73, p <.005). The presence or paranoia was also 
a significant predictor of the number of questions asked (beta = .44, t = 4.50, p 
<.005). The „R-squared-change‟ term was also significant, (F(1,68)=20.23, p < 
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.0005) indicating that paranoia predicted jumping to conclusions independently of 
and additionally to the presence of depressed mood.  
A second, similar, analysis was conducted using paranoia scale scores 
rather than the dummy variable representing presence or absence of paranoia. 
The results of this analysis paralleled the first, with scores on the paranoia scale 
(beta = -.45, t = -2.82, p < .01) predicting the number of questions asked 
independently of and additionally to the presence of depressed mood.   
          „Jumping to Conclusions‟ and Pre-morbid IQ. 
There was a significant association between total NART score and number 
of questions asked (Pearson‟s r = .46 p < .0005, df = 67).  No significant 
association was found between number of questions asked and participants age, 
number of previous admissions, and length of time since diagnosis although a 
significant association was found between number of questions asked and number 
of years in education (r = .32 p = .007, df = 70).  
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was considered to be an 
inappropriate means of eliminating the extraneous effect of IQ (Lord, 1967). We 
therefore selected, from the three groups, high-functioning participants whose 
estimated IQ was greater than or equal to 100. This resulted in 16 people 
remaining in the paranoid group, 15 in the depressed group and 24 in the control 
group, with no significant group differences remaining for IQ. The ANOVA on mean 
number of questions asked was then re-run. Again, the groups differed, (F(2,54) = 
14.90, p < .0005).  Tukey HSD tests revealed that the paranoid group asked 
significantly fewer questions than both the depressed (p < .05) and control groups 
(p < .005).  
Within this selected sub-group, however, there remained a significant 
correlation between estimated IQ and mean number of questions asked, (r  = .35, 
p < .01, df = 55).  Therefore, as a final investigation of the relationship between 
paranoia, IQ and jumping to conclusions, a multiple regression analysis was 
carried out on the complete data set with mean number of questions asked as the 
dependent variable.  Estimated IQ and whether paranoid or not were entered 
simultaneously as predictor variables. The regression equation was significant, 
                                                                                                Paranoid Reasoning  15 
(F(2,66) = 27.16, p <.0005). Both estimated IQ, (beta = .39, t = 4.29, p <.005), and 
whether paranoid or not, (beta = -.50, t = -5.40, p <.005), were significant 
predictors of jumping to conclusions. 
         Confidence in Decisions. 
The mean confidence ratings of each group were as follows: control 6.33 
(sd 2.12), depressed 5.50 (sd 2.13) and paranoid 5.95 (sd 2.56) The three groups 
did not differ significantly in their expressed level of confidence in decisions made 
during the reasoning task (F(2,64) = 0.77, p < .47). 
 Pearson‟s correlation revealed no relationship between confidence ratings 
and the mean number of questions asked (r = .11, p = .37, df = 65). 
         Need for Closure. 
Need for closure scores are shown in Table 1. The three groups did not 
differ significantly on these scores (F(2, 66) = 0.34, p < .717).  No relationship was 
found between need for closure and the mean number of questions asked (r = -
0.06 , p < .63, df = 67).  
         Reliability / Validity Of  Reasoning Task.    
A reliability analysis was conducted on the total number of questions asked 
on each of the five vignettes of the reasoning task. This yielded an adequate level 
of internal reliability (Cronbach‟s alpha = .76), indicating that participants were 
consistent in the number of questions they asked on each of the five separate 
vignettes. 
Although the attributional vignettes were presented in counter-balanced 
order, it was possible that the number of questions asked changed over the 
repeated presentation of the task. The changes over time in the number of 
questions asked in the three groups were examined in a repeated measures 
analysis of variance. This revealed significant change over time (Greenhouse-
Geisser F(2.65, 182.83) = 8.61, p < .0005), with a significant linear trend (F(1, 69) 
= 10.74, p > .002), and a significant interaction between time and group 
(Greenhouse-Geisser F(5.30, 182.83) = 2.70, p < .05). Examination of the mean 
number of items asked by each group for each of the five (counterbalanced) 
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vignettes, also presented in Table 2, reveals that the two clinical groups, but not 
the control group, asked fewer questions in response to later items. 
         Attributional Questions. 
There were differences in the number of questions asked over time, which 
produced inequality of variance. Therefore, in order to eliminate this, the proportion 
of internal, external-personal and situational questions, relative to the total number 
of questions asked, were calculated, and these scores are shown in Table 3. A 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used to examine differences 
between the three groups in these proportions. Significant differences between the 
three groups were found in the relative proportion and type of attributional 
questions asked, (Wilks‟ lambda F(6,134) = 4.82, p < .0005). There was a 
significant difference between the three groups in terms of the proportion of 
situational (F(2,69) = 8.42, p <.001 ), internal (F(2,69) = 5.01, p < .01) and external-
personal (F(2,69) = 3.72, p <.05) questions. Pairwise comparisons, (Tukey HSD) 
revealed that the paranoid and depressed groups differed in the proportion of 
internal questions asked (p < .01), with the paranoid group asking a lower 
proportion of internal questions than the depressed group. Also, the paranoid and 
control groups differed from each other with regards to the proportion of external-
personal questions (p < .05), with the paranoid group asking a higher proportion of 
external-personal questions than the control group. The control group differed from 
both the depressed (p < 0.05) and paranoid group (p < .001) in the proportion of 
situational questions asked, with the control group asking a significantly higher 
proportion of situational questions than both clinical groups. 
Attributional Decisions. 
The attributional decisions reached by the three groups are shown in Table 
2; there was no significant difference between the three groups in the attributional 
decision reached (Wilks Lambda, F(4,136) = 0.95, p = .44). 
„Poor Me‟  &  „Bad Me‟  Paranoia. 
In an exploratory investigation, participants in the paranoid group were 
divided into either „poor me‟ (n = 13) or „bad me‟ (n = 7), according to whether they 
believed that they deserved to be persecuted. Those individuals who were unsure 
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about whether they deserved to be persecuted (n = 4) were not included in 
subsequent investigations. Because of the small sample sizes involved, these data 
were not analysed but are presented in Table 4. 
Examination of Table 4 indicates a trend for the „bad-me‟ paranoia group 
to have poorer self-esteem (as indicated by higher total Rosenberg self esteem 
scale scores), but few differences in KGV scores, paranoia scale scores, need for 
closure scale scores or Beck depression scale (BDI-II) scores. 
The two sub-groups did not appear to differ markedly in the total number of 
questions asked on the reasoning task, or in the proportions of questions which 
implied internal, external-personal, situational or uncodeable attributions. Table 4 
does suggest, however, that the „bad me‟ paranoid subgroup made more internal 
attributional decisions. 
 
Discussion 
This study investigated „jumping to conclusions‟ in respect to causal 
attributions made by people with persecutory delusions. It revealed that 
participants with persecutory delusions asked significantly fewer questions than 
both depressed and non-patient participants before making causal attributions 
about personally salient hypothetical events. Depressed participants also asked 
fewer such questions than non-patient participants. The finding that individuals with 
persecutory delusions „jump to conclusions‟ is consistent with previous research 
(Dudley, John, Young & Over, 1997 a,b; Fear & Healy, 1997;  John & Dodgson, 
1994), although this is the first study to examine the possible relationship between 
attributional style and „jumping to conclusions‟.  Although there was clear evidence 
that the tendency to jump to conclusions was influenced by intelligence, with more 
intelligent participants making less hasty attributional decisions, this effect did not 
explain the observed differences between the paranoid patients and the 
comparison groups. The findings also do not seem to be explicable in terms of 
greater confusion in the clinical participants, as the three groups expressed similar 
levels of confidence in their judgements, and there was no correlation between the 
number of questions asked and reported confidence. 
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The findings of the present study are consistent with a recent interpretation 
of attributional processes in paranoia (Kinderman, 2001), which is based on 
Kruglanski & Webster„s (1994) account of normal attributional reasoning. In that 
model it is suggested that people employ search strategies, which are attempts to 
find possible or plausible explanations for events, and termination rules, which are 
heuristics for making a final choice about attributional locus. Kinderman, (2001) 
argued that search strategies are deficient in paranoia, possibly as a result of low 
cognitive resources or other deficits, and that termination rules are biased in favor 
of self-protective or self-enhancing causes for negative events. The findings of the 
present study partially support such an account, as the fewer number of questions 
asked by the deluded participants is consistent with the hypothesis of a deficient 
search strategy. In addition, however, the nature of the questions asked was also 
biased in line with the defensive model of paranoid attributions. This interpretation 
of the findings is similar to that offered by John and Dodgson (1994), who 
suggested that their deluded group displayed a cognitive style which reflected a 
“difference in cognitive processing style which limits the extent to which deluded 
subjects request information to help them form a decision” (p.45). It is possible that 
attributional decisions place particular strain on the search strategies employed by 
the persecutory delusions group.  
We initially hypothesized that need for closure, which might be expected to 
affect the termination rules employed during an attributional search, might explain 
deluded patients‟ tendency to „jump to conclusions‟. However, there were no 
significant differences found between the three groups on this measure. This 
finding is in conflict with those of Bentall and Swarbrick, (2001) and Colbert and 
Peters (2002), who both found higher need for closure scores in paranoid 
participants.  However, like us, Colbert and Peters found no relationship between 
„jumping to conclusions‟ and need for closure (Colbert & Peters, 2002). Thus, the 
idea that need for closure is a motivational factor involved in „jumping to 
conclusions‟ is not supported.  It must be considered that the termination rules for 
attributional search strategies are unlikely to be limited to “closure”, and may 
                                                                                                Paranoid Reasoning  19 
involve other motivational goals such as the avoidance of negative affect and the 
maintenance of a positive self concept (Kinderman & Benn, 2002). 
Our findings are, of course, open to various further interpretations. One 
possible alternative hypothesis could be that the differences found on the 
reasoning task were indicative of motivational difficulties within the clinical groups. 
Participants reduced the number of questions asked as the task proceeded. This 
may indicate either decreasing motivation or increasing skill at the task. Further 
possible alternative explanations include the possibilities that the results could 
implicate effects of tiredness, impatience, thought disorder, poverty of speech, 
difficulty sustaining attention, or neurocognitive deficits other than low intelligence. 
These considerations do not, however, undermine the validity of the findings. Such 
motivational difficulties or deficits have previously been identified as potential 
causes of deficient attributional search strategies (Kinderman, 2001). If it were the 
case that participants with paranoid or depressive problems arrived at attributional 
conclusions following a restricted search for evidence because they were 
unmotivated, preoccupied or otherwise impaired, this would carry important 
implications for how they employ search strategies and arrive at decisions in 
everyday life.  
The present study also revealed data gathering biases in participants with 
persecutory delusions, with a greater proportion of questions directed at external-
personal loci. This is again consistent with Kinderman‟s (2001) model of 
dysfunctional attributional search strategies. However, the prediction that there 
would be a difference between the three groups with regards to the final 
attributional decisions reached was not supported – there were no significant 
differences between the three groups in the number of external-personal, internal, 
and situational attributional decisions made.  This finding fails to replicate previous 
studies which have consistently found significant differences between the three 
groups, with depressed participants arriving at more internal attributions, control 
participants arriving at more situational attributions and paranoid participants 
arriving at more external-personal attributions, for negative events (Bentall, Kaney 
& Dewey, 1991; Candido & Romney, 1990, Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996; Kaney & 
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Bentall, 1989; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997a; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994). One 
possible reason for the present lack of significant findings is the fact that only a 
small number of vignettes were used, and hence a small amount of decisions 
reached by each participant, with the consequence that there was low statistical 
power to detect differences in the relative proportions of attributional decisions 
made to the three loci. Only five vignettes were chosen because of the level of 
demand they placed upon participants and the length of time involved in 
administering each.  
The present study also took no account of the dynamic nature of attributional 
judgments and the possibility that attributional judgments may vary across time and 
according to circumstance (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 
2001).  Bentall and Kaney (2005) have recently reported that the attributional 
judgements of paranoid patients are highly labile, and become much more internal 
for negative events immediately following the experience of failure. A broader 
examination of attributional dimensions in paranoia, focusing on how attributional 
judgements change over time, may be a fruitful area for further research. 
The depressed and deluded participants in the present study appeared to 
ask questions relating to their negative beliefs about themselves and the world. It 
would appear that both clinical groups were attempting to directly test out or 
confirm their beliefs. The bias exhibited in the persecutory delusions group towards 
asking more external-personal questions could be seen as a possible defensive 
strategy and a tendency to avoid attributing blame to the self (Bentall & Kinderman, 
1998; Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). 
The attributional differences observed between the so called „poor me‟ and 
„bad me‟ forms of paranoia warrant further attention. It is possible that there are 
two distinct types of paranoia associated with different psychological and 
attributional biases. Therefore, it is possible that the personalizing / defensive 
stance described by Kaney, Bentall and Kinderman (1994) is only true for „poor me‟ 
paranoia. However, it has recently been suggested that „poor me‟ and „bad me‟ 
paranoia may be manifestations of the same process, with „bad me‟ occurring 
when attempts to avoid internal attributions for negative events fail, so that the 
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individual becomes overwhelmed by negative beliefs about the self (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001). Consistent with this account, 
Melo, Bentall, & Taylor (in press) have recently found that some patients show 
marked changes in their judgements about the extent to which their persecution is 
deserved over relatively short periods of time (a few days). Few definite 
conclusions about the two types can be reached on the basis of the present data, 
because of the low numbers available in each of the groups. 
A possible criticism of the present study is that the patients in our deluded 
group had a range of diagnoses, the majority suffering from schizophrenia and a 
minority suffering from schizoaffective or bipolar disorder. However, these 
diagnostic categories have been criticized for their poor scientific validity, with a 
number of researchers arguing either for a unitary psychosis concept or for a 
continuum between schizophrenia symptoms and bipolar symptoms (as reviewed 
in Bentall, 2003). Moreover, the research strategy of targeting particular classes of 
behaviour and experience („symptoms‟) for investigation is now well-established. 
Given the doubts about the boundaries between schizophrenia and other 
psychoses, it seems unparsimonious to assume that different processes will lead 
to persecutory delusions in the different diagnostic groups. In fact, supplementary 
analyses, not reported here, in which only schizophrenia patients were included, 
and in which inpatients with delusions were compared to outpatients, did not 
undermine the findings of the analyses that we have reported in detail.  
A further, related criticism might be that the diagnostic classifications, and 
the identification of the presence or absence of delusional beliefs, were made by 
the first author, who was clearly not blind to the experimental investigation. It is 
therefore not possible to establish with certainly that other raters would have made 
the same decisions. In particular, it is possible that unconscious experimenter bias 
could have led to possible candidate participants being inappropriately included or 
excluded. Although therefore less than perfect, such an approach is common in 
research of this kind. Support for the validity of this approach is also evident in the 
presented data. That is, the scores of the different participant groups on measures 
of paranoia and depressed mood are wholly consisted with the experimental 
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classification. In terms of psychotic symptomatology, scores on the KGV also 
supported the experimental classification. That is, although the KGV was 
developed nearly twenty years prior to the publication of the DSM-IV, and is a 
measure of clinical phenomena rather than a diagnostic tool, participants‟ scores 
on this measure validated the diagnostic judgments.  
Despite recent advances in our understanding of the psychology of 
delusional beliefs, several key questions remain. The results of this study, and 
many of those that have preceded it, are unable to specify the extent to which the 
present findings are limited to individuals with persecutory delusions versus 
individuals who experience other delusions and the inclusion of another control 
group could possibly have clarified this issue. The results here are also essentially 
descriptive and do not indicate how such cognitive differences arise in individuals 
with persecutory delusions. It is not known whether attributional style and 
probabilistic reasoning difficulties precede, coincide or follow paranoid 
symptomatology. Investigations of patients in remission, developmental studies of 
high-risk individuals, and studies of „psychosis prone‟ healthy individuals may help 
to clarify these issues.  
An obvious clinical implication of the present findings is that therapy for 
individuals with persecutory delusions should pay particular attention to the 
possibility of a „jumping to conclusions‟ thinking style. It may be possible to use 
tasks similar to the one used in this study to investigate or assess this phenomena 
in individual clients.  Where indicated, therapy may attempt to directly address this 
style by encouraging individuals to become aware of their tendency to make hasty 
decisions and to take time prior to making decisions, carefully considering and 
evaluating any evidence before doing so. Cognitive-behavioural interventions 
designed to improve patients‟ attributional skills, which encourage patients to 
carefully consider the evidence supporting their attributional judgements, may be 
particularly useful (Kinderman, 2001, Kinderman & Benn, 2002, Kinderman & 
Bentall 1997b).  
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Table 1 : Demographic Data. 
__________________________________________________________ 
Group 
                              __________________________________________ 
   Control Depressed     Paranoid 
________________________________________________________________ 
Age    38.13 (10.61) 44.79 (11.12) 38.21 (11.26) 
Gender male   14  17  17 
 Female   10  7  7 
Number of years in education 13.46 (2.59) 11.21 (2.08) 11.29 (1.57) 
Months since 1st diagnosis -  82.09 (86.30) 63.53 (98.32) 
Previous psychiatric admissions -  2.08 (2.54) 2.63 (3.97) 
KGV total     2.08 (0.93) 11.00 (3.32) 18.67 (4.94) 
NART     115.50 (5.82) 104.92 (13.19) 107.10 (11.01) 
BDI – II    4.67 (5.18)  33.83 (13.94) 29.78 (13.17) 
Self-esteem    16.17 (4.51) 29.46 (4.73) 27.59 (5.85) 
Paranoia    31.83 (8.69)  29.56 (4.73) 27.59 (5.85) 
 Need for closure  166.88 (14.61) 165.39 (17.29) 169.50(19.10) 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2: Mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the number of 
questions asked, and attributional decisions reached, by group on the reasoning 
task. 
__________________________________________________________ 
Group 
                              __________________________________________ 
   Control        Depressed        Paranoid 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Mean number 5.10 (1.86)          3.43 (1.67)        1.81 (1.45) 
of questions 
__________________________________________________________ 
Item 1  7.67 (4.08)          4.79 (4.62)        2.17 (3.21) 
Item 2  4.17 (2.43)          3.42 (1.79)        1.63 (1.50) 
Item 3  4.79 (3.28)          3.33 (1.49)        2.13 (2.05) 
Item 4  3.75 (2.51)          3.13 (2.56)         1.67 (1.71) 
Item 5  5.54 (3.39)          2.50 (1.98)        1.50 (1.53) 
___________________________________________________________ 
Attributional decisions 
Internal  1.38 (.77)  1.79 (1.35)         1.71(1.20) 
External-  1.63 (.65)  1.58 (1.18)         1.71(1.37) 
personal 
 
Situational  2.00 (.66)  1.63 (.82)         1.58(1.06) 
           ___________________________________________________________
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Table 3 : Means for the proportion of internal, external-personal and 
situational questions asked on the reasoning task. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Mean   Std Error confidence interval 
       +95  -95 
 
Internal 
Control  .36  .04  .29  .44 
Depressed .41  .04  .33  .49 
Paranoid  .24  .04  .16  .31 
___________________________________________________________ 
External-Personal 
Control  .35  .05  .27  .44 
Depressed .38  .05  .29  .47 
Paranoid  .51  .05  .42  .60 
___________________________________________________________
Situational 
Control  .28  .03  .23  .34 
Depressed .17  .03  .12  .22 
Paranoid  .13  0.3  .01  .19 
___________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4: „Poor me‟ / „Bad me‟ Paranoia : Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of 
psychometric measures, number of questions asked, the attributional nature of questions and 
final attributional decisions, of the paranoid group divided into „poor me‟ and „bad me‟ 
paranoia. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     ‘Poor me’    ‘Bad me’ 
 
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 KGV    17.62 (5.20)    19.71 (4.72) 
 
 BDI-II    27.50 (11.87)    33.43 (17.55) 
 
 Self-esteem   25.45 (5.89)    31.71 (5.25) 
 
Paranoia scale   72.75 (11.53)    68.14 (9.10) 
 
Need for closure  172.27 (23.48)    168.29 (16.38) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Number  
 of questions.   1.65 (1.42)    2.49 (1.72) 
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Proportion of 
 Internal questions  .25 (.21)    .19 (.26) 
 
 Proportion of  
 External-Personal  .42 (.29)    .61 (.36) 
 Questions 
 
 Proportion of 
 Situational questions  .17 (.16)    .05 (.07) 
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Internal Decisions  1.08 (.95)    2.43 (1.27) 
 
 External-personal  2.08 (1.50)    1.14 (1.21) 
 Decisions 
 
 Situational Decisions  1.85 (1.07)    1.43 (1.13) 
 __________________________________________________________________________ 
